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NOTES
AIDING AND ABETTING THE BREACH- OF FIDUCIARY DUTY:
WILL THE GREENMAILER BE HELD LIABLE?*
IN the arena of corporate takeovers, it is not unusual for a corpo-
ration to repurchase shares accumulated by a prospective tender
offeror at a premium over market price. The non-prorata repur-
chase targets only the shares of the tender offeror. This strategic
repurchase of targeted stock to stop the tender offeror from taking
over the company, commonly referred to as greenmail, has been
highly controversial.' Increasingly, the shareholders of the target
* The author wishes to thank James L. Ramey for support and tolerance above and
beyond the call of duty.
1. The flurry of legislative proposals addressing the subject of greenmail over the last
few years reflects this controversy. In 1984, the Securities and Exchange Commission re-
leased the results of a study of the stock price movements of 89 firms implementing
targeted stock repurchases. See The Impact of Targeted Share Repurchases (Greenmail)
on Stock Prices, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,713 (Sept.
11, 1984) [hereinafter Impact of Greenmail]. The study concluded that the overall effect of
greenmail on the wealth of non-participating target shareholders is negative. The purpose
of the study was to lend support to an SEC proposal which would have restricted the
repurchase of more than three percent of the outstanding securities from any individual
holder at a price above the market price, unless the shareholders approve the purchase.
While several bills were submitted to Congress for consideration after the SEC propo-
sal, none were enacted. See, e.g., S. 2782, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. 2777, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); S. 2754, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984); H.R. 5693, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1984). Attempts to restrict the payment of greenmail continue. See, e.g., S. 1323,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8, 133 Cong. Rec. 7601-02 (1987); H:R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987).
One statute specifically addressing the payment of greenmail has been enacted. The
Internal Revenue Service has subjected any person who receives greenmail to a non-de-
ductible 50% excise tax on any gain realized. I.R.C. § 5881 (West Supp. 1988). The
provision, which went into effect after December 15, 1987, defines greenmail as any consid-
eration paid by a corporation in redemption of its stock if such stock has been held by the
shareholder for less than two years, and the shareholder (or any related person or person
acting in concert with the shareholder) made or threatened a public tender offer for stock
in the corporation during that period. While this statute makes greenmail a less profitable
undertaking by giving the IRS a piece of the pie, it does not prohibit the payment of
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corporation are calling the recipients of greenmail, the green-
mailers, into court and seeking to hold the greenmailers liable for
the receipt of the premium paid.' Will these claims succeed? As
this Note demonstrates, whether the greenmailer will be held lia-
ble is a function of the willingness of the courts to recognize the
presence of conflicts of interest in corporate directors.
In attempts to establish liability for greenmailers, sharehold-
ers allege that the corpordte directors breached their fiduciary
duty to shareholders by paying the price of a targeted stock repur-
chase and that the greenmailer aided and abetted that breach by
paying a premium over the market price. Part one of this Note
examines the requirements for establishing a claim of aiding and
abetting the breach of fiduciary duty. One of the elements of such
a claim is knowledge of the breach of the principal wrongdoer,
who in this case is the director acting as agent for the sharehold-
ers. If the greenmailer is to be held liable for simply knowing the
fact that greenmail is paid, it must be assumed that harm flows
directly or indirectly to the shareholders from the payment of
greenmail out of the corporate assets. However, as part two dem-
onstrates, the theorists and scholars support such divergent views
on the effects of greenmail that there is no consensus on the harm
or benefits of greenmail, and thus no standard by which to mea-
sure the behavior of the greenmailer. The greenmailer in most in-
stances cannot "know" that harm will flow to the shareholders
when there is so much ambiguity in the theory regarding the ef-
fects of greenmail.
If knowledge of the payment of greenmail alone is not
enough, what type of knowledge will result in liability for the
greenmailer? The answer, set out in part three, is that the green-
mailer must have knowledge of the conflict of interest of the direc-
tors before liability can be imposed. When directors are conflicted,
they are faced with an overriding motivation that might (1) keep
them from closely analyzing the effect of the greenmail payment,
or (2) cause them to ignore the results of their analysis. Only
greenmail.
2. Some find it unpalatable to hold the greenmailer liable when he is simply pursuing
his own interests in a business transaction executed between two parties. See SENATE
COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, TENDER OFFER DISCLOSURE AND
FAIRNESS ACT OF 1987, S. REP. No. 265, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 155 (1987) [hereinafter
SENATE REPORT] (proposals by Sen. D'Amato to amend the bill as reported out of commit-
tee by imposing liability on the issuers of the shares (the managers) as well as on the
greenmailers).
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when the managers are conflicted can a greenmailer "know" that
harm is likely to flow to the shareholders.
In the end, the determination of liability for a greenmailer
hinges not on establishing the greenmailer's knowledge of actual
harm flowing to the shareholders, but on the court's willingness or
unwillingness to acknowledge the presence of conflicts of interest
influencing the decisionmaking of directors. Part four of this Note
presents a survey of judicial willingness to recognize managerial
conflict in three different jurisdictions and the corresponding will-
ingness or unwillingness to recognize a cause of action against the
greenmailer.
I. THE COMMON LAW BASIS FOR AIDING AND ABETTING THE
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
A claim of aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty
may be found in the common law of several jurisdictions. Courts
recognize that "directors of a corporation stand in a fiduciary re-
lationship to the corporation's shareholders."' If the duties created
by that fiduciary relationship are breached, a third party may be
held liable for aiding and abetting the breach of the principal.4 As
a federal district court in New York explained:
[I]t is not essential that one occupy a direct fiduciary relation-
ship as a predicate to the imposition of liability based upon a
claim of breach of duty. One who knowingly participates in or
joins in an enterprise whereby a violation of a fiduciary obliga-
tion is effected is liable jointly and severally with the recreant
fiduciary. Even assuming [the defendant] himself did not stand
in a direct fiduciary relation to the plaintiffs, he is charged with
having conspired knowingly with those who were their fiducia-
ries. The charge having been made, suit to enforce the claimed
liability may properly be maintained in this court.5
3. Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349, 351 (Del. Ch. 1972). See also
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath v. Tuckman, 372 A.2d 168, 170 (Del.
1976)(comparing the fiduciary duty of corporate officers and directors to the duty of a
trustee). For a discussion of the fiduciary duties owed to shareholders, see infra notes 95-
102, 115-18 and accompanying text.
4. Examination of those cases in which the third party is held liable for breach of a
separate fiduciary duty owed directly to the shareholders is beyond the scope of this Note.
A dominant shareholder and a titular director or officer (or even an agent of the firm)
would probably be held liable for a direct breach of duty rather than for aiding and
abetting.
5. Oil & Gas Ventures-First 1958 Fund, Ltd. v. Kung, 250 F. Supp. 744, 749
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (footnotes omitted).
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Therefore, those who knowingly participate in the breach by cor-
porate officials may be held jointly and severally liable.'
The wording of the elements necessary to establish liability
for aiding and abetting vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The
"well settled" law of New York sets forth three elements.7 "The
claimant must prove (1) a breach by a fiduciary of obligations to
another, (2) that the defendant knowingly induced or participated
in the breach, and (3) that the plaintiff suffered damages as a
result of the breach." An alternate formulation of the elements
requires the plaintiff to demonstrate (1) a breach of fiduciary duty
by the principal, (2) knowledge of this wrongdoing by the alleged
aider and abettor, and (3) substantial assistance or encourage-
ment provided by the alleged aider and abettor to the principal.9
Although phrased differently, both formulations require some type
of action and some type of knowledge of the breach.
In recognizing a cause of action against the alleged aider and
abettor, courts may refer to trust law. According to the Restate-
ment (Second) of Trusts, a third party transferee who takes trust
property knowing of a breach of trust by the trustee cannot claim
the property free of the trust."0 The requirement that the third
party know of the breach of trust is consistent with the knowledge
requirement imposed on the alleged aider and abettor in the
breach of fiduciary duty. Like the test for aiding and abetting, the
Restatement has an implicit requirement that the third party take
6. See Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 589 (1921); Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath
& Horwath v. Tuckman, 372 A.2d 168, 170 (Del. 1976).
7. S & K Sales Co. v. Nike, Inc., 816 F.2d 843, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1987).
8. Id. (quoting Whitney v. Citibank, N.A., 782 F.2d 1106, 1115 (2d Cir. 1986)).
This formulation is similar to that found in Delaware which requires the plaintiff to "allege
(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) a breach of the fiduciary's duty, and (3)
knowing participation in that breach by the defendants." Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker,
298 A.2d 349, 351 (Del. Ch. 1972). The allegation of damages is also required as a fourth
element. Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1057 (Del. Ch. 1984).
9. Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness, 611 F. Supp. 1006, 1016 (S.D.N.Y.
1984)(applying Missouri law). This formulation is roughly the same as that applied to
aiding and abetting federal securities law violations. See IIT, An Intern. Inv. Trust v.
Cornfield, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); Rolf V. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570
F.2d 38, 47-48 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978). However, it is noteworthy
that the subject of the alleged aider and abettor's awareness in the case of securities law
violations is typically fraud or concealment. The analysis of the elements required to estab-
lish aiding and abetting fraud is quite different from the analysis of aiding and abetting the
breach of fiduciary duty. For an examination of aiding and abetting in the field of securi-
ties law, see Note, Liability for Aiding and Abetting Violations of Rule l0b-5: The Reck-
lessness Standard in Civil Damage Actions, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1087 (1984).
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 296-297 (1957).
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action. This portion of the Restatement addresses only situations
in which the third party takes receipt of or in some way lays claim
to the trust property. The aiding and abetting requirements of ac-
tion and knowledge may therefore be based on the law of trusts.
In addition to drawing on the law of trusts, several jurisdic-
tions have turned to tort law as support for the liability of the
aider and abettor.-" A comment to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts provides that when a fiduciary relationship is breached, a
person acting in concert with the fiduciary can be held liable for
the harm done." Subsection (b) of section 876 would require that
the person acting in concert with the fiduciary know of the fiduci-
ary's breach and give him "substantial assistance or encourage-
ment." ' These requirements strongly support both formulations
of the test for establishing a claim of aiding and abetting the
breach of fiduciary duty.
Given these theories on which the greenmailer may be held
liable, what is the likelihood that liability will be established? To
establish the "action" requirement, courts examine whether a de-
fendant "induced or participated in the breach" or provided "sub-
stantial assistance or encouragement." The level of participation
need not rise to the level of fraud or collusion; the plaintiff need
not establish that the directors and the greenmailer failed to con-
duct arms-length negotiations. 4 Even if the greenmailer can me-
ticulously document the adversarial nature of the negotiations,
II. See, e.g., S & K Sales Co. v. Nike, Inc., 816 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir. 1987);
Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness, 611 F. Supp. 1006, 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Marine
Midland Bank v. Smith, 482 F. Supp. 1279, 1290 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aftd, 636 F.2d 1202
(2d Cir. 1980).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874, comment c (1976). The comment pro-
vides that "[a] person who knowingly assists a fiduciary in commiting a breach of trust is
himself guilty of tortious conduct and is subject to liability for the harm caused thereby."
Id.
13. Id. § 876. The elements required to establish liability for assisting in the breach
are set out in section 876:
Persons Acting in Concert
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is
subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common
design with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious re-
sult and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to
the third person.
14. Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349, 351 (Del. Ch. 1972).
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aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty could be estab-
lished. A court could well conclude that receipt of the greenmail
payment, without more, constitutes sufficient participation to sat-
isfy the element of "substantial assistance."
The minimal level of participation required suggests that the
real issues will be whether the corporate directors, the principal
wrongdoers, will be held liable and whether the greenmailer
"knew" of their breach. In examining the element of knowledge of
the breach, it is necessary to determine the level of scienter re-
quired. At least one jurisdiction has held that proof of intent to
harm is not necessary to establish aiding and abetting the breach
of fiduciary duty.15 On the other hand, "mere suspicion or even
recklessness as to the existence of a breach is insufficient."' 16 The
greenmailer will only be held liable if actual knowledge of the
breach is established.'
A focus on the actual knowledge of the alleged aider and
abettor rather than on what the defendant "should have known" is
supported by two different considerations. First, unlike the princi-
pal wrongdoers who are the directors of the corporation, the al-
leged aider and abettor has no direct fiduciary duty to the share-
holders of the corporation.' When the alleged aider and abettor is
a corporation, the defendant will owe no fiduciary duty to the
plaintiff shareholders and may owe an affirmative duty to its own
shareholders. The lack of a direct fiduciary duty to the target cor-
poration shareholders justifies requiring a higher level of aware-
ness of the breach on the part of the aider and abettor before
imposing liability than would be required of the principal wrong-
doer who owed a direct duty.
A second consideration supporting an actual knowledge re-
quirement is related to the concern that the imposition of aider
and abettor liability not "disrupt commercial activity in a manner
15. S & K Sales Co. v. Nike, Inc., 816 F.2d 843, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1987). In S & K
Sales, Nike entered into an agreement with an employee of S & K Sales. Id. at 845. The
corporation allegedly participated in the breach of the employee's fiduciary duty. Id. at
847. In its defense, Nike relied on agency law to argue that it could not be liable unless the
court found that it intended to harm S & K Sales. The Restatement (Second) of Agency
supports this view, stating that a third party who "intentionally causes or assists an agent
to violate a duty to his principal, would be held liable." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 312 (1957). The court rejected this argument.
16. Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness, 611 F. Supp. 1006, 1027 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1030.
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wholly inconsistent with the purposes of aider and abettor liabil-
ity."19 Third parties must be able to conclude corporate transac-
tions with confidence that they will not be drawn into disputes
between managers and their shareholders. Furthermore, parties to
arms-length negotiations are not expected to disclose to each other
the details of their respective positions.20 It would be unreasonable
to impose on the alleged aider and abettor a duty to uncover all
that goes on in the "inner councils."'" To encourage the certainty
of commercial transactions and to facilitate arms-length negotia-
tions between parties, the courts establish liability for the alleged
aider and abettor only upon a showing of actual knowledge of the
breach of fiduciary duty.
Having established that evidence of actual knowledge of the
breach is required, the next question in the analysis of aider and
abettor liability entails analyzing the subject matter of the actual
awareness that will result in liability.
II. THE PAYMENT OF GREENMAIL: HARM OR BENEFIT TO THE
SHAREHOLDERS?
The greenmailer clearly has knowledge of the fact that green-
mail, which by definition includes a premium over market price, is
paid. Is the knowledge of the payment alone sufficient to satisfy
the element of knowledge of the breach? To answer this question,
it is necessary to examine the conflicting views regarding
greenmail.
A. The Conflicting Views of Greenmail
In recent years greenmail has been the subject of much de-
bate and little agreement among legal scholars. At one end of the
spectrum are those who propose a ban on all greenmail.22 At the
other end of the spectrum are those who argue that greenmail
19. Id. (citing Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1985)).
20. Solash v. Kurlander, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,608 (1988).
21. Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness, 642 F. Supp. 917, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
affd, 846 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1988).
22. See Note, Greenmail: Targeted Stock Repurchases and the Management-En-
trenchment Hypothesis, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1046, 1064 (1985)(proposing a federal
ban on greenmail to protect shareholders from the misappropriation of corporate assets by
directors for their own benefit). See also Gordon & Kornhauser, Takeover Defense Tac-
tics: A Comment on Two Models, 96 YALE L.J. 295, 320 (1986)(favoring a rule which
would proscribe greenmail entirely except, perhaps, in a specific transaction approved by a
majority of disinterested shareholders).
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serves a useful function in the corporate arena. 3 Taking the mid-
dle ground are others who suggest that there are some occasions
when the payment of greenmail may be appropriate. 4
1. The Case Against Greenmail
A debate over the relative harm or benefit to the shareholders
underlies the theoretical debate regarding the role of greenmail.
Some scholars see only the harm flowing from the payment of
greenmail. Even if the directors believe they are acting to further
the best interests of the corporation, there are at least two ways in
which shareholders may be harmed. First, the firm may have paid
more than the market value of the shares, thereby reducing the
value of the remaining shares. Second, the repurchase of a signifi-
cant number of shares may have reduced the likelihood of a subse-
quent take-over bid. In addition to the harm that may flow from a
poor business decision to pay greenmail, directors may be faced
with a conflict of interest and may choose to pay greenmail in
order to retain control. Many scholars who criticize greenmail
view it as a misappropriation of corporate assets.2 5 Under this
view, the directors and officers are criticized for making payments
to preserve their positions of power26 and for paying a premium to
just one shareholder rather than to all shareholders.
23. See Dennis, Two-Tiered Tender Offers and Greenmail: Is New Legislation
Needed?, 19 GA. L. REV. 281, 341 (1985)(suggesting that legislative and other proposals
limiting greenmail should be rejected since greenmail benefits the market for corporate
control and does not harm shareholders as a class).
24. See Impact of Greenmail, supra note 1 (proposing the requirement of a share-
holder vote to approve greenmail rather than outright prohibition, since any other rule
would hinder beneficial repurchases for the purposes of eliminating dissident minorities and
of signaling the market that shares are undervalued); Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical
Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J. 13, 61 (1985)(concluding that courts
should allow the payment of greenmail when the payment enhances the welfare of share-
holders); Shleifer & Vishny, Greenmail, White Knights, and Shareholders' Interest, 17
RAND J. EcON. 293, 307-08 (1986)(suggesting the value of greenmail as a signal to pro-
spective bidders when other signaling mechanisms are not available, but recognizing those
situations in which greenmail may be abused); Comment, Greenmail: Can the Abuses Be
Stopped?, 80 Nw. UL. REV. 1271, 1305, 1308, 1318 (1986)(arguing that the use of green-
mail may be justified on an economic basis since it may facilitate takeovers by reducing
costs for potential bidders and also recommending that courts adopt an economic analysis
in applying the business judgment rule).
25. Note, supra note 22, at 1046.
26. See infra notes 28-52 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
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a. The Management-Entrenchment Hypothesis
According to the agency cost theory,2 8 the separation of own-
ership from control in the modern corporation,29 with shareholders
claiming ownership and with control residing in management, re-
sults in a conflict of interest for managers. Directors are forced to
choose between fulfilling their duty to maximize shareholder value
and furthering their own interests within the corporation."° As di-
rectors promote their interests at the expense of ownership inter-
ests, agency costs3' are incurred by shareholders.
In theory, shareholders are able to monitor management deci-
28. See T. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 303-05 (7th ed.
1986)(Agency cost theory states that separation of ownership and control creates a need
for residual claimants to observe management's activity. These observation costs fall upon
the shareholders which, in turn, reduce the overall value of the firm for shareholders.).
29. A. BEARLE & G. MEANS. THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
119.26 (1932).
30. Note, supra note 22, at 1048. This conflict of interest is evident not only as
managers seek compensation and perquisites, but also as they enter new businesses or di-
versify activities to stabilize earnings, assuming that these actions are contrary to share-
holder interests.
31. Professors (now Judge) Easterbrook and Fischel have explored the subject of
agency costs in the takeover context. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Tar-
get's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1168-74
(1981). While acknowledging specific advantages which flow from the separation of owner-
ship and control, they also recognize the agency costs which exist:
Corporate managers (which include both officers and members of the
board), like all other people, work harder if they can enjoy all of the benefits of
their efforts. In a corporation, however, much of the benefit of each manager's
performance inures to someone else, whether it be shareholders, bondholders, or
other managers. The investors must be given a substantial share of the gains to
induce them to put up their money. Because no single manager receives the full
benefit of his work, he may find that, at the margin, developing new ventures
and supervising old ones takes too much effort to be worthwhile; each manager
may reason that someone else is apt to do the work if he does not or to take the
rewards even if he does well. No manager will be completely vigilant. So some
managers will find it advantageous to shirk responsibilities, consume perquisites,
or otherwise take more than the corporation promised to give them. One espe-
cially important way in which managers' performance falls short of the ideal is
in choosing the firm's other agents. Because no manager can obtain all of the
benefits available to the firm from making good decisions, no one takes all cost-
justified steps to recruit and train those employees best suited for their jobs. As a
result, many firms will have some employees. . . who, although fully dedicated,
ought not to be in the positions they hold. These agency costs of less than opti-
mal management cause the firm's shares to trade for less than the price they
would achieve if agency costs were zero.
Id. at 1169-70. Therefore, agency costs may be a factor under either inefficient or incompe-
tent management.
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sions, but the costs of monitoring may be substantial.s2 Similar
obstacles deter managers from monitoring themselves and their
colleagues.33 This dilemma has prompted several scholars to sug-
gest that tender offers provide the best method of monitoring
managers and reducing agency costs.34 Prospective bidders search
for firms in which the value of the firm can be increased by re-
placing inefficient management.3 5 A market for corporate control
is thereby created.36 Without the threat of acquisition, managers
would be free to take actions which increase agency costs and
harm shareholders.
The most common criticism of greenmail, contained in the
management-entrenchment hypothesis, flows from an application
32. Easterbrook and Fischel provide several explanations for the unlikelihood of ef-
fective monitoring by shareholders. Id. at 1170-71. At the outset, they note that sharehold-
ers typically are "passive investors seeking liquid holdings. They have little interest in man-
aging the firm and less incentive to learn the details of management." Id. at 1171. Second,
any benefit gained from monitoring the managers must be shared with all shareholders as
the management of the firm improves. The possibility of other shareholders free-riding on
the benefits found in effective monitoring encourages passivity. Finally, effective monitoring
by any one shareholder is to no avail if the shareholder is without power to compel the
managers to improve their performance. Id.
33, Like shareholders, managers are concerned with free-riding in their efforts to
monitor the firm. In addition, managers working in teams may find it difficult to determine
individual contribution and may be unwilling to discipline those they view as their col-
leagues. Id. at 1172-73.
34. Dennis, supra note 23, at 309 n.143.
35. According to Easterbrook and Fischel, monitoring by prospective bidders pro-
vides benefits to a firm even when there is no apparent problem with inefficient or incompe-
tent management and increased agency costs:
More significantly for our purposes, shareholders benefit even if their corpo-
ration never is the subject of a tender offer. The process of monitoring by outsid-
ers poses a continuous threat of takeover if performance lags. Managers will
attempt to reduce agency costs in order to reduce the chance of takeover, and
the process of reducing agency costs leads to higher prices for shares.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 31, at 1174.
This view of the value of monitoring all firms is not without its critics. As noted by
Senators Sasser, Sanford, and Chafee, "[e]conomic evidence of which we are aware dem-
onstrates that corporate takeovers, especially hostile ones, have usually been directed in-
stead at efficient management, have not generally resulted in more competitive corpora-
tions, and have caused significant hardship to many corporate constituencies." SENATE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 70.
36. The concept of a market for corporate control is generally attributed to Henry
Manne. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110,
117-18 (1965). By encouraging the replacement of inefficient managers, creating synergies
between firms, and bridging the gap between the divergent interests of shareholders and
managers, the market for corporate control helps to ensure that society's resources are used
to their fullest potential. Dennis, supra note 23, at 283.
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of the increased agency costs analysis to the takeover context.37
When exposed to a hostile takeover, managers are faced with
more intense conflicts of interests, forcing them to choose between
shareholder interests and preserving their own positions within the
corporation. The use of corporate assets in the payment of green-
mail, under this analysis, represents management's decision to re-
tain power at shareholders' expense. 8 Several empirical studies
appear to support the view that the payment of greenmail is made
to the detriment of the shareholder.39
The assumptions underlying the management-entrenchment
hypothesis have, however, come under attack. The theory assumes
that without the payment of greenmail, the bidder would have
taken control and incumbent management would have been re-
placed.40 As Professor Roger Dennis points out, however, a bidder
37. For a more detailed discussion of agency costs and greenmail, see Macey &
McChesney, supra note 24, at 38-43; Note, supra note 22, at 1048-49.
38. Easterbrook and Fischel argue that the only proper response to a tender offer is
complete managerial passivity. At most, management should offer resistance to takeover
attempts only to the extent that they may issue a press release urging shareholders to reject
the offer. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 31, at 1164, 1201.
By contrast, other scholars, who also endorse a general prohibition against takeover
defense tactics, believe that there are benefits derived from requiring management to facili-
tate an auction for tender offer bids. Bebchuck, The Case for Facilitating Competing
Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1029-30, 1054 (1982)(arguing that target share-
holder welfare and social welfare are enhanced when management is required, as part of its
fiduciary duty, to seek a higher offer); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations:
The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 848, 867
(1981) [hereinafter Gilson, A Structural Approach] (rejecting defensive tactics in general
but recommending active negotiations by target management in order to produce tender
offer information which facilitates shareholder comparison of the value of the target with
the value of the offer). See also Bebchuck, The Case for Facilitating Tender Offers: A
Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23, 24-25, 45-46 (1982)(providing further support
for an "auctioneering rule" and emphasizing the need for a regulatory delay period to
secure the time that is necessary for competing bids); Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids
Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REv. 51, 62-64, 66 (1982)(ar-
guing that allowing management to solicit competing bids may increase the return to the
bidder on the costs of the search and will more efficiently allocate assets to their most
productive users). But see Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender
Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1, 21 (1982)(responding to the proponents of facilitating auctions
and emphasizing the possibility of decreased returns to potential bidders, resulting in de-
creased monitoring in general).
39. Two studies which compared the stock prices of firms paying greenmail before
and after the payment found significant declines in share prices when firms paid greenmail.
See Dann & DeAngelo, Standstill Agreements, Privately Negotiated Stock Repurchases,
and the Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN. ECON 301, 307 (1983). It is posited that
a decline in the value of the firm as measured by the price of a share is not in the best
interests of the firm's shareholders. Macey & McChesney, supra note 24, at 43.
40. Dennis, supra note 23, at 333.
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might be deterred by other defensive measures and, even if the
takeover is successful, incumbent management may be retained.41
Even if greenmail is paid, those in management may not be
successful in preserving their positions. 42 The greenmail may sig-
nal4 other prospective bidders that opportunities for takeover
gains exist.4 4 Therefore, Professors Jonathan Macey and Fred
McChesney argue that if managers pay greenmail in order to pre-
serve their jobs, they must be prepared to repeat the process with
other bidders in the future.45 A pattern of greenmail payment
would eventually result in the removal of management by share-
holders or by a successful bidder.4 In this sense greenmail is
"firm-specific. '4 7 Unlike other defensive tactics which are in-
tended to protect against both present and future takeover at-
tempts, greenmail eliminates only one bidder - the greenmailer.
Since other takeover attempts are likely to follow, management
cannot logically expect to preserve its position. Therefore, Macey
and McChesney conclude that the hypothesis that greenmail is
paid to entrench management is flawed.48
41. Id.
42. Professor Dennis notes that the ability of management to maintain tenure follow-
ing greenmail payment may be a function of the number of shares which they directly
control. If management controls a "significant" proportion of total outstanding shares, the
repurchase may decrease the number of shares available to the other bidders and thereby
decrease the likelihood of additional takeover attempts. If management holds a limited
number of outstanding shares, the chances for further takeover attempts are not dimin-
ished. Id. at 333-34.
43. See infra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
44. The payment of greenmail informs the market that one bidder identified poten-
tial takeover gains. This evaluation may gain credibility in the market place if the original
bidder has made public the specific source of those gains by disclosing future plans for the
target. Dennis, supra note 23, at 334.
45. Macey & McChesney, supra note 24, at 41.
46. Professors Macey and McChesney see this result as inevitable since the repeated
payment of greenmail decreases firm assets:
The more greenmail a firm pays, the greater the diminution of its assets,
and so the greater the drop in the price of its shares. This drop in share price
alerts shareholders to management's pursuit of job tenure rather than firm prof-
its, thereby increasing the likelihood of management being ousted. Moreover,
this drop may facilitate takeover by yet another outsider, whose first act will be
dismissal of the management that has dissipated firm assets so fruitlessly. Thus,
even if one believes that agency costs are a formidable problem in larger corpo-
rations, greenmail seems a self-defeating tactic for managers concerned about
job tenure.
Id.
47. Id. at 42.
48. Macey and McChesney may be overestimating the role of logic in the manage-
rial response. It is not difficult to imagine a "short-sighted" response, based on a perceived
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Agency cost problems may also be overstated. Managers who
pursue their own interests at the expense of shareholder interests
may be disciplined by the "market for managers." 49 This force
serves to monitor agency costs independently of the market for
corporate control. Further, if agency costs pose particular
problems in the greenmail context, shareholders could choose to
draft charter amendments which prohibit greenmail outright or
which require approval by a majority of disinterested sharehold-
ers.10 The costs for drafting such a provision would be minimal in
a newly-formed corporation. The fact that few corporations, in-
cluding those newly-formed, have pursued this option is inconsis-
tent with the basic premises of the agency-cost theory.
Even if the management-entrenchment hypothesis correctly
predicts management behavior, there may be no valid reason to
prohibit greenmail payments.51 Shareholders who expect a higher
takeover bid may prefer to eliminate the original bidder and may
endorse the payment of greenmail, even if it is made to entrench
management.52
b. The Unfairness Objection
Another objection to the payment of greenmail focuses on the
premium paid to the bidder for the repurchase of shares. Fairness
seems to dictate that the appropriate price to pay for outstanding
shares held by a minority shareholder posing a threat of takeover
is the price at which all other shares are sold on the open mar-
ket.5 a However, the minority shareholder is viewed as possessing
de facto control over the corporation.54 To regain that control, a
immediate need for self-preservation.
49. Macey and McChesney, supra note 24, at 40-41 n.91.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 42.
52. "[S]uccessful firms are precisely those that align shareholder and manager incen-
tives. Managers may do the right things (from the shareholders' perspective) for the wrong
reasons." Id.
53. Arguably a large block of shares offered for sale at one time might disrupt the
market. The result would be a discounted price, or "blockage penalty" for the block of
shares. Dennis, supra note 23, at 339.
54. If the bidder has established actual control, the repurchase of shares at a pre-
mium would constitute self-dealing and would no longer be considered greenmail. Macey
& McChesney, supra note 24, at 48 n.121. See also Nathan & Sobel, Corporate Stock
Repurchases in the Context of Unsolicited Takeover Bids, 35 Bus. LAW. 1545, 1554
(1980)(arguing that the "fairness doctrine" and special kinds of fiduciary duty should be
applicable only when the bidder selling the block of shares is in a control position).
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premium over market price is typically paid to the minority share-
holder. Only one shareholder receives a premium for the repur-
chase of control. This unequal treatment of shareholders is viewed
as unfair. 5
Critics of this reasoning emphasize that unequal treatment of
shareholders may not be unfair if the equality among shareholders
is superficial and if significant differences exist which justify dif-
ferentiated treatment.56 If a repurchase of control is viewed as the
real basis for the premium, an argument against the unfairness
objection can be made. The value of control has been increased by
the minority shareholder who reasonably expects to keep the gain
produced.5 7 Other shareholders who expect to share in the pre-
mium are actually trying to free-ride on a gain produced by only
one shareholder. An equal opportunity for all shareholders to sell
their shares at a premium would actually be unfair to the minority
shareholder.
The payment of greenmail may also be defended if the pre-
mium is viewed as a payment for information rather than for re-
purchase of control. 58 If a higher takeover bid is likely, the share-
holders may be willing to pay the greenmail, including the
premium, to obtain information developed by the greenmailer.
The minority shareholder who has identified a means for increas-
ing the value of the firm is not equal to all other shareholders.
Payment of a premium for information is, therefore, not unfair.
2. The Case in Favor of Greenmail
The economic theories which support greenmail emphasize
the role of information in the market for corporate control. Man-
agers who possess non-public information may use greenmail to
signal the market and facilitate an auction for competing bids.5"
55. The critics of greenmail maintain that the minority shareholder's stock should be
acquired through a tender offer made to all shareholders. Macey & McChesney, supra
note 24, at 48.
56. For example, to counter the argument that a large block of shares be sold at
market value just as small blocks of shares, it is possible to justify a premium based on
several advantages to the corporation. The corporation would have to pay a premium to
accumulate a significant number of its securities on the open market. This premium is
simply paid to the minority shareholder who has already accumulated the block and
thereby removed price and timing uncertainties in the repurchase plan. Nathan & Sobel,
supra note 54, at 1554.
57. Macey & McChesney, supra note 24, at 48-49.
58. Id.
59. See infra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
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Alternately, bidders may be encouraged to seek out and act on
information regarding undervalued firms if greenmail is available
to reduce the risk involved for the bidder.6 0
a. The Shareholder Welfare Hypothesis
The agency cost theory61 is based on the theory of efficient
capital markets which maintains that all relevant and ascertaina-
ble information is immediately incorporated into the market price
of shares.6 2 Without debating this widely accepted hypothesis, the
proponents of greenmail build a theory based on the limits of the
efficient capital markets theory. While all public information may
be reflected in share price, the theory does not suggest that pri-
vately held information is also incorporated.6 3 Directors may pos-
sess inside information which leads them to believe that their cor-
poration's shares are undervalued on the market.64  If the
information loses its value when revealed, 5 the directors cannot
align the correct value of the firm with market share price simply
by making public the information.
Directors may recognize that their firm offers gains which
can be realized by a potential acquiror. However, they may choose
to reject an initial tender offer if the bid is too low or if there is a
strong likelihood that a higher bid can be obtained.6 6 Relying on
private information, management may selectively reject one bid-
der, thereby signalling to other prospective bidders the existence
60. See infra notes 75-91 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
62. The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH) assumes that the prevailing
stock price immediately assimilates new information provided to the market. See generally
Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383
(1970); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and
the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1978); Gilson & Kraakman,
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Gordon & Kornhauser,
Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761,
770 (1985).
63. Note, supra note 22, at 1049.
64. Introduction of a new product or the value of a particular asset are examples of
the type of information which may be non-public. Comment, supra note 24, at 1304.
65. For example, trade secrets must be kept proprietary or they will lose their value.
Note, supra note 22, at 1050.
66. Professors Macey and McChesney have developed in detail a theoretical frame-
work in which greenmail may improve the price shareholders receive by facilitating an
auction for bids. Macey & McChesney, supra note 24, at 16-27. Earlier arguments favor-
ing an auction for tender offer bids did not contemplate the use of greenmail in such a
manner. All defensive tactics were considered indefensible. See supra note 38.
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of unidentified gains worthy of investigation.67 This signal may fa-
cilitate an auction for control of the firm to the highest bidder.
The payment of greenmail thereby maximizes shareholder
welfare.
Several assumptions underlying this theory have been at-
tacked.68 The analysis seems to require differentiation between
"conscientious" and "self-interested" management. In cases of
conscientious management, greenmail is paid when management
believes that the bid offered is too low and that a higher bid is
possible. If the greenmailer were to agree with management's val-
uation of the firm and saw the potential for another bidder, he
would offer a higher bid and pursue acquisition rather than accept
the greenmail. To objectively justify the payment of greenmail,
management's beliefs regarding the likelihood of a higher bid
must be more accurate than the beliefs held by the original bid-
der.69 However, in some instances the beliefs of the original bidder
may be more accurate. °
67. For a thorough analysis of the use of greenmail as a signal to other potential
bidders, see Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 24. The authors argue that the payment of
greenmail signals the market that the target corporation has not yet identified a "white
knight." Id. at 294-95. A "white knight" is a "potential acquirer invited by the target
management to top an initial offer opposed by that management." Id. at 294. The existence
of a white knight would ordinarily deter prospective bidders from seeking additional infor-
mation about the target corporation. The signal that there is no white knight can en-
courage the acquisition of information and facilitate an auction. In this way, greenmail
may benefit shareholders. Id. at 307.
68. See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 22, at 313-19 (criticizing the framework
established by Macey and McChesney). For a vigorous defense of their original work, see
Macey, Takeover Defense Tactics and Legal Scholarship: Market Forces Versus the Poli-
cymaker's Dilemma, 96 YALE L. 342 (1986) and McChesney, Assumptions, Empirical
Evidence and Social Science Method, 96 YALE L.J. 339 (1986).
69. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 22, at 315.
70. The question of who is more accurate may depend on the anticipated source of
gains:
In cases of synergistic undervaluation, target management might reasonably be
unaware of potential synergies with other assets, while the acquiror more proba-
bly would understand the manner in which the target's assets would enhance
operations like its own ....
If the undervaluation results from management inefficiency, target manage-
ment arguably should have more accurate beliefs, since it has the most compre-
hensive knowledge about the target's current operations. But why would consci-
entious management be subject to undervaluation due to management
inefficiencies? Perhaps management is well-meaning but incompetent. Incompe-
tence suggests that management requires a takeover to cure its own deficiencies;
yet management's incompetence must not prevent its accurate valuation of the
target's assets. This combination of incompetent management and accurate valu-
ation is implausible.
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Yet another assumption underlies the justification of green-
mail in cases of conscientious management. Before management
can facilitate an auction, several bidders must be available. If only
one other bidder exists, the final bidder would not be motivated to
offer a higher bid once the greenmailer was removed from
competition. 7'
If directors are self-interested, they will pay greenmail only
when they believe that another bid is unlikely. If management
were aware of another, higher bidder, the payment of greenmail
would be self-defeating.72 For greenmail to be justified as benefit-
ting shareholders in this context, mdnagement's beliefs must be
inaccurate and other bidders must be available for auction. 73 The
argument here is not that the assumptions themselves defeat the
shareholder welfare theory, but that it is unlikely that the assump-
tions are valid.74
b. The Free-Rider Problem
As noted earlier, many scholars assert that high agency costs
are a primary cause of undervaluation of a firm. 5 Shareholders
and managers are unable to effectively monitor management and
reduce these costs. A major obstacle hindering shareholders is the
free-rider problem. Shareholders are unwilling to monitor man-
agement because gains resulting from their efforts, specifically the
improved performance of the firm, will be distributed among all
shareholders.76 Similarly, managers might be unwilling to monitor
management when other managers and shareholders can free-ride
on the information produced. 77
Id. at 315-16.
71. Id. at 316.
72. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
73. Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 22, at 317-18.
74. Gordon and Kornhauser have summarized their conclusions regarding the only
possible circumstances in which shareholders would want to pay greenmail:
Shareholders would want management to pay greenmail only (1) when conscien-
tious management has more accurate and more favorable beliefs about the pros-
pects of a third party bid, or (2) when self-interested management has more
accurate and more favorable beliefs about the true value of the firm than the
acquiror but less accurate and less favorable beliefs about the prospects of a
successful third party bid. These circumstances are highly unlikely.
Id. at 319.
75. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 32.
77. See supra note 31.
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Prospective bidders must also contend with the free-riding
problem.18 To identify targets for takeover, potential acquirors
seek information on unrecognized sources of gains. The gains may
flow from identifying potential synergies or from identifying ineffi-
cient or incompetent management. However, the cost of acquiring
this information may be substantial. While these costs may be
recouped by the gains realized in a successful acquisition,"9 an at-
tempt at takeover may not succeed.
By acting on the information, the prospective bidder signals8"
others in the marketplace that the target is the source of previ-
ously unrecognized gains. Other bidders, with no information costs
to recover, are free to enter a bidding contest with the original
bidder."' The result of this free-riding is that each bidder must
face a substantial risk in initiating a bid for a target.82 The effect
on the market for corporate control is that the overall number of
initial bids is reduced. 3 Potential bidders are likely to reduce or
terminate the search for information. a
Greenmail may be viewed as a solution to this problem. Since
all other defensive measures increase the likelihood of failure of
takeover attempts, they serve to decrease the number of initial
bids and the search for information. 5 Availability of greenmail
payments, on the other hand, may increase the number of initial
bids by decreasing the bidder's risk of incurring unrecovered
search costs and by simultaneously mitigating the free-rider prob-
lem. 8 The possibility of a greenmail payment may persuade the
bidder that the risks of offering the initial bid are sufficiently re-
duced to justify initiating an information search. Therefore, green-
mail may represent a payment to the offeror for the market price
of the shares held plus a premium to reimburse the offeror for the
78. See Note, supra note 22, at 1055-56.
79. The total cost to be recouped includes not only the search costs for the targeted
corporation, but also the costs for unsuccessful searches. Id. at 1055.
80. Id. at 1049.
81. Bids entered by subsequent contenders can be higher than the original bid since
only the original bidder must expend resources to cover search costs. The original bidder
must raise the offer or admit defeat. Macey & McChesney, supra note 24, at 29.
82. See Comment, supra note 24, at 1303-04.
83. Macey & McChesney, supra note 24, at 29.
84. Just as all shareholders benefit when tender offerors monitor the market, all
shareholders are harmed when the risk of uncompensated costs decreases the search for
information. See supra note 35.
85. Macey & McChesney, supra note 24, at 30.
86. Id.
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costs incurred in the acquisition of information. Shareholders ben-
efit from increased monitoring of the market by potential bid-
ders87 and specifically from the information produced which re-
sults in an auction for a higher bid.88 Greenmail is distinct from
all other forms of defensive tactics in that it appears to benefit the
shareholder.
The scholars who criticize the payment of greenmail as a par-
tial solution to the free-rider problem rely on empirical studies
which indicate that share prices decline immediately after the
greenmail payment.89 Managers are under a duty to protect the
interests of shareholders who, empirically, are harmed by green-
mail.90 The risks and costs to potential bidders should be of no
concern to managers.9' The critics conclude that greenmail should
not be paid.
3. The Consequences of Ambiguity in the Theory
The disagreements among scholars concerning the harm or
value of greenmail make it clear that this is a subject on which
reasonable minds can differ. Regarding the payment of greenmail,
Macey and McChesney have observed that "greenmail is [not] an
unmitigated good, but . .. it is not an unmitigated bad, either.
No unambiguous inference can be made from the mere fact that
greenmail is paid . "92
Since the payment of greenmail is an ambiguous act, it can-
not automatically be assumed to be a breach of fiduciary duty.
The fact that the greenmailer knows the payment of greenmail
includes a premium does not mean that the greenmailer knows a
priori that harm will outweigh the benefits to shareholders or that
the directors have breached their fiduciary duties. The ambiguity
and uncertainty of the theories surrounding greenmail indicate
that a greenmailer should not be held liable for aiding and abet-
ting the breach of fiduciary duty merely on the basis of the knowl-
edge that greenmail was paid and received.
87. Dennis, supra note 23, at 332.
88. Macey & McChesney, supra note 24, at 32.
89. See supra note 39.
90. Note, supra note 22, at 1056.
91. Id.
92. Macey & McChesney, supra note 24, at 50.
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B. Implications for the Liability of Managers
While bills proposing regulation of greenmail still exist,"3 the
ambiguity of the theory may explain why legislators have been
unwilling to set out hard and fast rules governing the payment of
greenmail. Presently, as long as there is full disclosure to share-
holders of the greenmail payment, it is unlikely that corporate di-
rectors will be held liable for a violation of federal law.9 4
When it is alleged that directors have breached their fiduci-
ary duty under state law, the ambiguity of the theory alone af-
fords some protection for the directors. In addition, managers are
protected by the judicial application of the business judgment
rule.
Under state law, directors typically are given the authority to
manage the business and affairs of the corporation and to delegate
their power of management to others, 5 such as corporate officers.
However, for the protection of the shareholders, the managers are
also charged with the fiduciary duty of care. 6
93. See supra note 1. Consideration of existing and proposed federal and state regu-
latory statutes is outside the scope of this Note. For an analysis of state legislative actions
and federal securities law regarding greenmail, see Comment, supra note 24, at 1292-1301.
For a critical assessment of legislative initiatives against greenmail, see Macey & McChes-
ney, supra note 24, at 51-53. For a criticism of current legislative proposals which "legal-
ize" greenmail by creating a safe harbor and for an alternate proposal for evaluating
greenmail in terms of its effect on stock prices after the repurchase, see Gilson, Drafting an
Effective Greenmail Prohibition, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 329, 331, 352-53 (1988).
94. Dennis, supra note 23, at 283.
95. The Model Business Corporation Act provides that "[a]ll corporate powers shall
be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation
managed under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to any limitation set forth in
the articles of incorporation." MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.01 (b) (1984). The official
comment indicates that the wording is intended to provide leeway for those corporations in
which direct management by directors is impractical. In such cases, the board may dele-
gate to appropriate officers those powers which the board is not required by law to exercise
itself. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.01 (b), official comment (1984). State statutes
contain similar provisions. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(a) (West Supp. 1988); DEL
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (Supp. 1988).
96. The duty of care is identified in section 8.30(a) of the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act:
General Standards for Directors
(a) A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as
a member of a committee:
(I) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exer-
cise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the
corporation.
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AT § 8.30(a) (1984). Subsection (2) sets out the standard for the
1988-89] LIABILITY OF GREENMAILERS 1291
The duty of care is the standard to which managers are held.
Directors must demonstrate that they prepared adequately for the
decisionmaking process by showing that their judgment was in-
formed.97 However, courts are reluctant to second guess the qual-
ity of the analysis and the actual judgment that led to a particular
decision. If the decision is informed, the courts will give deference
to "honest business judgment" 98 and will not hold managers "lia-
ble for mistakes of judgment in actions arguably taken for the
benefit of the corporation." 99 Therefore, "even though hindsight
indicates the decision was not the wisest course," 00 managers will
be afforded some protection by the courts. This protection, re-
ferred to as the business judgment rule,'0 ' means that courts,
while still requiring informed judgment, will be unwilling to scru-
tinize the actual analysis undertaken and the judgment made as
long as "any rational business purpose can be attributed to [a]
decision."10 2
duty of care. Similar standards are established by state common law or statute. See, e.g.,
CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West Supp. 1988).
97. "The judgment of the directors must be an 'informed' one, with the inquiry
directed to the material or advice the board had available to it and whether it had sufficient
opportunity to acquire knowledge concerning the problem before acting." Moran v. House-
hold Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1075 (Del. Ch.), aft'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). How-
ever, the courts may give wide latitude to the managers in fulfilling this duty. For example,
when B.F. Goodrich was faced with a possible takeover attempt, it consummated an acqui-
sition for which it had unsuccessfully negotiated earlier. The court accepted the officers'
reliance on studies and financial analyses completed four years earlier with only a brief,
handwritten memorandum of valuation for the acquisition and a sheet of paper containing
longhand calculations to provide updated information. Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich
Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 709 nn.3 & 6 (N.D. I11. 1969)(applying New York law).
98. Northwest Indus., 301 F. Supp. at 711. The court defined "honest business
judgment" as "the exercise of that care which businessmen of ordinary prudence use in
managing their own affairs." Id. The requirement of ordinary prudence echoes the stan-
dards set forth in section 8.30(a)(2) of the Model Business Corporation Act. See supra
note 96.
99. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1074 (Del. Ch.), afl'd, 500
A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
100. Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 505, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964).
101. Jurisdictions vary in their wording of the rule. The following is typical of the
language used by Delaware courts:
The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the managerial preroga-
tives of Delaware directors . . . . It is a presumption that in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company.
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citations omitted).
102. Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 568 (Del. Ch. 1977)(involving the repur-
chase of stock from a dissident director/shareholder).
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The directors of the corporation are afforded protection by
both the ambiguity of the theory regarding greenmail and the bus-
iness judgment rule. The act of payment is ambiguous, and the
decision to pay will not be judicially reviewed with strict scrutiny.
C. Implications for the Liability of Greenmailers
The act of payment of greenmail is, without more, insufficient
to establish the liability of the greenmailer. First, the ambiguity of
the theory makes it difficult to determine at the time of payment
whether the harm will exceed the benefit. Second, even if the
harm does outweigh the benefit, the protection provided by the
business judgment rule makes it unlikely that the courts will con-
clude that the directors breached their fiduciary duty of care.
Therefore, awareness of the payment alone does not satisfy the
knowledge requirement for aiding and abetting the breach of fidu-
ciary duty by the directors.
However, it is important to recognize the limits of this con-
clusion. If the greenmailer has knowledge of actual harm to the
shareholders, in addition to knowledge that the greenmail was
paid, the additional knowledge may satisfy the element of knowl-
edge of the breach. In Heckmann v. Ahmanson,10 3 Saul Steinberg
and associates acquired more than two million shares of Walt Dis-
ney Productions.' 4 Interpreting this action as an initial step in a
takeover action, the Disney directors countered by acquiring the
Arvida Corporation and thereby assuming $190 million in debt.'0 5
Three months later the Disney directors repurchased all of the
Steinberg shares for approximately $77 a share, which included a
premium over the market price.'06 This repurchase, which the
court categorized as greenmail, was financed through increased
borrowing.107 With the debt assumed following the acquisition of
103. 168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1985). For a discussion of the role
that Heckman played in establishing tort liability for the greenmailer, see Note, Liability
for Greenmailers: A Tort is Born, 19 IND. L. REv. 761 (1986).
104. Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 124, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177, 180
(1985).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 124-25, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 180-81. The exact market price at the time of
repurchase is not stated. However, Steinberg was prepared to pay $67.50 a share in a
tender offer at that time. Assuming that this figure approximates market price, Steinberg
received a premium of $9.50 a share, or fourteen percent of market price. According to the
repurchase agreement, part of the repurchase price was a reimbursement of the costs Stein-
berg incurred in preparing the tender offer. Id.
107. Id. at 124, 126, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 180-81.
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Arvida and the repurchase of the Steinberg shares, corporate debt
rose to two-thirds of equity.""8 This action harmed the sharehold-
ers because it negatively affected the corporation's credit rating
and stock prices.
In reviewing a lower court decision to issue an injunction
which, in effect, imposed a constructive trust on the profits of the
repurchase," 9 the court of appeals concluded that at the trial on
the merits, Steinberg could be held liable as an aider and abettor
in the breach of fiduciary duty." 0 Steinberg "knew or should have
known Disney was borrowing the $325 million purchase price.
From its previous dealings with Disney, including the Arvida
transaction, it knew the increased debt load would adversely affect
Disney's credit rating and the price of its stock.""' The argument
that Steinberg had actual knowledge of harm flowing to the Dis-
ney shareholders is strengthened by the fact that Steinberg, while
still a shareholder, attempted to block the acquisition of Arvida
and the assumption of the $190 million debt with a derivative
suit."x2 If Steinberg had argued in court that the assumption of
Arvida's debt would lower shareholder value, then the increase in
debt to finance the repurchase could only further harm the share-
holders. These facts suggest that the greenmailer knew that the
actual harm to shareholders exceeded the benefits." 3
Therefore, when the greenmailer possesses actual knowledge
of harm to the shareholders, there is a possibility" 4 that the re-
quirement of knowledge of the breach will be satisfied. However,
if the greenmailer knows only that the shares are being repur-
chased at a premium, the ambiguity of the theory regarding
greenmail and the protections of the business judgment rule pre-
clude the possibility of concluding a priori that the shareholders
will be harmed and that a fiduciary duty will be breached.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 123, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
110. Id. at 127, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 182-83.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 124, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 103-12.
114. It is not clear that the court would have concluded that knowledge of actual
harm would be sufficient in and of itself to establish the element of knowledge of the
breach. The court also stated that Steinberg and associates "knew it was reselling its stock
at a price considerably above market value to enable the Disney directors to retain control
of the corporation." Heckmann, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 127, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 182 (emphasis
added). For the significance of this additional information, see infra notes 115-84 and ac-
companying text.
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III. THE PREREQUISITE KNOWLEDGE: THE FIDUCIARY'S
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
If knowledge of the payment of greenmail, without actual
knowledge of specific harm flowing to the shareholders, is insuffi-
cient to establish knowledge of a breach of fiduciary duty, what
knowledge is required? Three cases involving takeovers and merg-
ers suggest an answer, although they do not involve greenmail. In
each case the knowledge required to establish knowledge of the
breach of fiduciary duty is the actual knowledge of the managers'
conflict of interest.
A. Conflict and the Business Judgment Rule
As noted earlier, state law gives managers the authority to
manage the business and affairs of the corporation, but simultane-
ously imposes on them duties of care and loyalty to protect the
shareholders.1 5 To meet the duty of care, the managers' decision
must be an informed one, but great deference is given to the anal-
ysis and judgment stages of the decision making process. This def-
erence, the business judgment rule, means that the courts will use
a lower level of scrutiny when examining the analysis and judg-
ment aspects of a business decision.
The duty of loyalty requires directors to subordinate their
own interests and to single-mindedly pursue the best interests of
the corporation.1 1 6 If the directors are faced with a conflict of in-
terest, the decision may be self-serving and, therefore, a breach of
the fiduciary duty of loyalty. When there is evidence of a conflict
of interest and breach of the duty of loyalty, the protection af-
forded by the business judgment rule is removed. While manage-
rial decisions which reflect poor judgment or incompetence are
shielded by the business judgment rule, decisions which are con-
flicted are not similarly protected. The courts raise the level of
judicial scrutiny and require the defendants to show that the deci-
115. See supra notes 95-102 and accompanying text. For an argument that the duty
of care and duty of loyalty analysis cannot resolve the conflict of interests concern
presented by defensive tactics, see Gilson, A Structural Approach, supra note 38, at 821-
31.
116. The Model Business Corporation Act requires a director to discharge his duties
"in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation." MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)(3). See supra note 96. If the directors pursue the best
interests of the corporation, the value of the firm will be maximized, which is in the best
interests of the shareholders.
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sion made was fair to shareholders.117 The closer scrutiny will typ-
ically be triggered by a showing of fraud or bad faith.'
B. Consequences of Conflict in the Managers
Once a court determines that managers are conflicted in their
decisionmaking, the court will look more closely at the decision
reached. Directors then must establish that in spite of the possibil-
ity of conflict, they did not breach their duty of loyalty.
During a takeover attempt, the offeror may or may not know
that the directors have actually succumbed to the conflict of inter-
est. If the greenmailer in a takeover attempt has actual awareness
of the existence of a managerial conflict of interest, however, the
courts will let stand a claim of aiding and abetting the breach of
fiduciary duty. The courts seem to conclude that once the offeror
has knowledge of a conflict, the ambiguity of the results of the
payment dissipates. Where there is knowledge of the presence of
conflict, the offeror has imputed knowledge of the harm to share-
holders and of the breach of fiduciary duty.
There are two cases from the Delaware courts addressing the
aider and abettor claim. In Gilbert v. El Paso Co.,' 9 the chancery
court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on a
claim of aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duties. 20 Bur-
lington Industries (Burlington) had initiated a hostile takeover of
El Paso Company (El Paso) by making a tender offer for fifty-one
percent of El Paso's shares.' 2' The tender offer was made, how-
117. See, e.g., Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness, 611 F. Supp. 1006, 1018
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), afd, 846 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1988)(the court held that transferring trust-
ees breached no fiduciary duty in selling trust assets and liquidating the trust to thwart a
tender offer, and that imposition of a constructive trust was unwarranted).
118. See, e.g., Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 233 (9th Cir. 1975)(requiring
"fraud or breach of trust" to entertain a challenge to the business judgment of the direc-
tors under California law); Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712
(N.D. Ill. 1969)(requiring "proof of fraud or manifestly oppressive conduct to set aside an
action of the directors" under New York law); Moran v. Household Int'l, 490 A.2d 1059,
1074 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985)(requiring "fraud or bad faith" to hold
directors liable for mistakes of judgment under Delaware law).
119. 490 A.2d 1050 (Del. Ch. 1984).
120. Id. at 1058. However, the court did dismiss charges based on infringement of
contractual rights and on a direct fiduciary duty. Id. at 1051. While the chancery court
upheld the availability of a claim of aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty, at the
trial on the merits the court held that the directors did not breach their fiduciary duties,
and therefore, rejected the aiding and abetting claim. Gilbert v. El Paso, No. 7075, slip op.
(Del Ch. Nov. 21, 1988).
121. Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1053 (Del. Ch. 1984).
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ever, subject to certain "conditions" which anticipated common
defensive tactics.'22 If these events occurred, Burlington had a
right to terminate the offer. 23 Over the following three weeks, al-
though several of the conditions occurred, Burlington did not
withdraw the tender offer.' 24 At the end of that three week period,
when it was clear that a sufficient number of shares had been ten-
dered and that Burlington would obtain a fifty-one percent inter-
est in El Paso, Burlington and the El Paso board of directors
reached a "friendly" agreement. 125 The agreement terminated the
first tender offer and commenced a second offer.12 6 A key differ-
ence between the two offers was the number of shares for which
Burlington tendered. 2 ' In the first tender, Burlington offered for
25.1 million shares at a twenty-five percent premium over market
price. In the second tender, Burlington offered the same price for
only 21 million shares. 2 8 The remaining shares it needed in order
to acquire fifty-one percent of El Paso were obtained by purchas-
ing treasury shares and shares owned by certain El Paso directors
who had not tendered in the first offer. 9
In a class action, El Paso shareholders who had tendered in
the first offer claimed that they were harmed by the agreement
with Burlington.'"0 Not only was the second tender offer for fewer
shares, but it was oversubscribed with more than 40 million shares
tendered.' 3' Even though the tender price remained unchanged,
the shareholders who had tendered in the first offer were denied
the opportunity to obtain the premium on all of their shares, since
shares were purchased on a pro rata basis.'32 The plaintiffs argued
122. Id. The "conditions" included "(1) litigation challenging the tender offer, (2) a
change, or proposed change, in the business, assets, or properties of El Paso, (3) the issu-
ance of, or a proposal to issue, additional shares of El Paso stock, (4) the adoption of, or a
proposal to adopt, any amendment to El Paso's charter or by- laws, and (5) a definitive
agreement for a merger or other business combination between El Paso and Burlington."
Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. Later, Burlington acquired all the remaining outstanding shares of El Paso
at the same premium price. Id. at 1054. However, this final offer was not announced when
the second tender was made. Not expecting to be able to obtain the same premium, several
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that the El Paso directors, recognizing the inevitability of a take-
over, "abandoned their resistance in order to fashion a better deal
for themselves at the expense of certain of its shareholders."' 3
Therefore, the El Paso directors had breached their fiduciary duty
to their shareholders. 34 Through its agreement with the El Paso
directors, Burlington allegedly aided and abetted the breach. 1 5
The court rejected Burlington's argument that it was merely
conducting arms-length negotiations and pursuing the best inter-
ests of its own shareholders in its negotiations.'36 The court
observed:
Clearly, the purchase of approximately 556,000 shares from El
Paso's directors, who had disdained tendering into the December
offer, falls within the ambit of a claim of civil conspiracy. By
agreeing to purchase them from El Paso's directors, Burlington
is chargeable with knowledge that El Paso's directors were pre-
ferring their interests to certain of its shareholders who had al-
ready tendered. 137
Burlington "presumably was aware that certain terms [of the
agreement] would result in certain of El Paso's own shareholders
being squeezed out of the second offer."' 38 Burlington's awareness
of the directors' conflict of interest and its awareness of the harm
flowing from that conflict would be sufficient to establish knowl-
edge of the El Paso directors' breach of fiduciary duty."3 9
shareholders sold their shares on the open market without the benefit of the premium. Id.
133. Id. at 1056. The concern here is self-dealing rather than entrenchment.
134. Id. at 1057. The board was free to attempt to persuade the shareholders not to
tender their shares, but it could not "interfere with the alienability of the tendered shares
by pursuing its own interests." Id.
135. Id. at 1056.
136. Id. at 1057-58.
137. Id. at 1057.
138. Id. at 1056.
139. The court distinguished an earlier chancery court case, Weinberger v. United
Financial Corp. of California, No. 5915, slip op. (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1983). Weinberger was
a derivative action in which the plaintiffs alleged that the price paid for the shares of a
target corporation, United Financial, in an acquisition by National Steel Corp. (National)
was inadequate, even though the price included a premium of 78% over the market price
of the stock on the day before the announcement. Id. at 2, 9, 10. In a hearing on the
defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court concluded that there was a question
of fact as to whether United Financial's board exercised an informed judgment in approv-
ing the merger agreement, but that there was no evidence of conflict of interest. Id. at 13,
16-17, 20. "The decision, in retrospect, may not have been the best decision which could
have been made. That, however, is not the test for judicial review." Id. at 22.
The plaintiffs also alleged that National was liable for the transaction as an aider and
abettor. Id. at 29. However, the court concluded that "[e]ven if plaintiff could show liabil-
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A subsequent Delaware chancery court decision also briefly
addresses aiding and abetting. In Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont
Mining Corp.,'40 the tender offeror, Ivanhoe,"4' began to acquire
the stock of Newmont Mining."" After investigating a number of
defensive moves,' 43 Newmont reached an agreement with its larg-
est shareholder, Gold Fields,14 4 by which Gold Fields would in-
crease its holdings of Newmont stock to 49.9 percent through a
"street sweep."' 45 Following a successful street sweep, Gold
Fields' and Newmont's directors would own a majority of
Newmont's outstanding shares. 46 Ivanhoe's tender offer, which
was conditioned on Ivanhoe owning fifty-one percent of Newmont
stock, would thereby be defeated. 47 Ivanhoe and a class of
Newmont shareholders sought injunctive relief' 48 against the
street sweep, alleging that the Newmont directors had breached
four fiduciary duties. 49 Gold Fields allegedly had aided and abet-
ity on behalf of the board of United Financial, no fact has been adduced to indicate that
National aided and abetted the United Financial board in any way." Id. There was evi-
dence in the record that National had been advised that the stock was worth at least $44 a
share, although the final price offered was only $33.60 a share. Id. at 5, 9. Therefore,
National knew the price was inadequate. The court could have concluded that National
knew that the directors' decision was a poor one and that United Financial's shareholders
would be harmed. However, the evidence did not support the allegation that National knew
of any conflict of interest. Once again, the court seems to have been looking for knowledge
of managerial conflict of interest before imposing liability for aiding and abetting.
140. 533 A.2d 585 (Del. Ch.), af'd, 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
141. One of the entities controlling Ivanhoe was Mesa Holding Limited Partnership,
which is controlled by T. Boone Pickens. Id. at 592.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 592-97.
144. In 1981, Gold Fields announced its intention to acquire 25 to 50 percent of
Newmont's stock. After initial resistence by Newmont, the two corporations entered into a
standstill agreement in which Gold Fields was prohibited from acquiring more than 331
percent of Newmont's stock unless a third party acquired 9.9 percent or more of Newmont.
Id. at 591. Ivanhoe's acquisition of 9.95 percent of the stock entitled Gold Fields to termi-
nate the standstill agreement. Id. at 592.
145. Id. at 589. A "street sweep" is defined by the court as "a rapid accumulation of
a large block of [a] target corporation's stock, through open market or privately negotiated
purchases or a combination of both." Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Injunctive relief was eventually denied. Id. at 610.
149. Id. at 589, 600. The alleged breaches included: (1) maintaining control in viola-
tion of the duty of loyalty to shareholders, (2) effecting a "lock-up" scheme which pre-
vented shareholders from obtaining the highest price through a bidding auction and dis-
criminating among contenders for control, (3) coercing those shareholders selling in the
street sweep and using undisclosed material inside information, and (4) pursuing defensive
measures that did not correspond to any reasonably perceived threat. Id.
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ted some of the breaches.15 0
The court rejected all but one of the allegations of breach of
fiduciary duty.151 In the remaining allegation, Newmont was
"charged with having adopted defensive measures not responsive
to any reasonably perceived threat to corporate policy and which,
in all events, were unreasonable in relation to whatever threat
may have existed."'1 52 The court focused on the agreement be-
tween Gold Fields and Newmont. To help Gold Fields finance its
street sweep, Newmont declared a $33"per share dividend to all
shareholders.' 53 In exchange, Gold Fields agreed in a standstill
agreement to hold its interest to 49.9 percent of outstanding
stock. 5 The problem with the agreement was that it "required
Gold Fields to vote its Newmont stock for Newmont's director
nominees, and substantially restricted Gold Fields' ability to
transfer its Newmont shares to a third party free of the standstill
restrictions." 55 The plaintiffs alleged that the restrictions would
entrench Newmont's board of directors and preclude any future
takeover bid for Newmont.'56
The court noted that Newmont reasonably perceived a threat
from both Gold Fields and Ivanhoe. 57 Furthermore, the standstill
agreement itself was a reasonable response to the threat posed by
Gold Fields.' 58 However, in restricting Gold Fields' right to vote
and to dispose of its shares, Newmont "went too far."'1 59
By thus 'locking up' Gold Fields' 49.9% stock interest, the
standstill agreement guaranteed the incumbency of the
Newmont Board (or their designees) and, as a practical matter,
assured the defeat of any hostile takeover attempt for possibly
ten years. That agreement operated, then, to entrench the
Newmont Board. 60
The restrictions contained in the agreement were an unreasonable
150. Id. at 600.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 597.
154. Id. at 597-98.
155. Id. at 590.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 607.
158. Id. at 608.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 608-09. In the opinion of the court, the fact that Newmont and Gold
Fields had adopted amendments to remedy these restrictions was relevant to a discussion of
the appropriate reitedy, and not to the analysis of liability for breach. Id. at 609.
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response to the threat posed.' 6 '
The Ivanhoe court did not address in detail the role of Gold
Fields in aiding and abetting Newmont's breach. The court simply
held that the agreement provisions were "a violation of the
Newmont directors' duties, . . . in which Gold Fields, as a con-
tracting party that could not have been unaware of the entrench-
ment effect of those provisions, aided and abetted.' 6 2 However,
in this statement the court pinpointed the knowledge critical to
establish aiding and abetting. If Gold Fields was aware of "the
entrenchment effect" of the agreement, then Gold Fields must
have realized not only that the Newmont directors were conflicted
in their decisionmaking, but also that they acted in their own self-
interests.
The most straightforward statement of the knowledge re-
quired to establish aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary
duty is found in Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness.'63 The
court dismissed the allegation of aiding and abetting since the
plaintiffs had failed to show actual knowledge of the breach. 6 4 In
Terrydale, the plaintiff was a successful but frustrated tender of-
feror which had attempted to acquire the Terrydale Realty Trust
(TRT), a Missouri real estate investment trust, 6 5 over a period of
one year.' 66 During that year, the trustees of TRT unsuccessfully
sought other tender offer bids, then sold eighty percent of the trust
assets and made two different liquidating dividends in a plan to
liquidate the trust. 6  Approval of the creation of the Terrydale
Liquidating Trust (TLT) and election of offerors' nominees as
trustees occurred at the same meeting. 68
The trust assets were sold to San Francisco Real Estate In-
vestors (SFREI) .16 The Terrydale Liquidating Trust in the hands
of the "successful" offeror sought to hold SFREI as an aider and
abettor in the alleged breach of fiduciary duties by the trustees of
161. Id.
162. Id. (emphasis added).
163. 611 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
164. Id. at 1012, 1015, 1031 (applying Missouri law).
165. For several reasons the court concluded that the business judgment rule and the
conflict of interest analysis applicable in the corporate setting would also be applicable to a
real estate investment trust. Id. at 1016-17.
166. Id. at 1013-14.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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TRT.170 To establish the breach the plaintiffs sought to demon-
strate the self-interest of the TRT directors. 71 Since the record
before the court suggested potential self-interest by a majority of
the TRT trustees, the court could not grant summary judgment
based on the presumptions of the business judgment rule.172 How-
ever, summary judgment could still be granted if, as a matter of
law, the transactions were fair and reasonable to TRT and its
shareholders. 7 a After further analysis of the fairness of the trans-
action, the court concluded that the record did not support the
grant of summary judgment. 7 4 The issue of the breach of fiduci-
ary duty was one for the trier of fact.
The Terrydale court then turned to the element of knowledge
of the breach of fiduciary duty. Only actual knowledge of a
breach of duty would suffice to establish liability for the aider and
abettor. 175 Mere suspicion, recklessness, mere notice, and unrea-
sonable unawareness were all insufficient. 17 6 Plaintiffs had to es-
tablish that the alleged aider and abettor had knowledge of the
objective unfairness and unreasonableness of the transaction, and
of the "facts and circumstances demonstrating that the trustees
acted in furtherance of their own self-interest."'177
Applying the above standard, the court concluded that
SFREI did not have knowledge of the self-interest of a majority of
the directors. 8 While the plaintiffs had alleged that the directors
who were known to be self-interested had dominated and con-
trolled the others, 79 there was no evidence that SFREI knew of
the alleged domination and control. 8 ' Whether or not SFREI
should have known of the domination and control was not rele-
vant to an analysis of SFREI's potential liability as an aider and
abettor.' 8'
170. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the TRT trustees breached their fiduciary duties
by selling and liquidating the trust property for self-interested reasons and at "fire sale"
prices. Id.
171. Id. at 1019.
172. Id. at 1023.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1026.
175. Id. at 1027.
176. Id.
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 1028.
179. Id. at 1022-23.
180. Id. at 1028.
181. Id.
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According to the court, absence of knowledge of managerial
self-interest defeats the allegation of aiding and abetting. Knowl-
edge of the unfairness of the transaction alone is insufficient to
establish liability.182 Even if SFREI believed that the selling price
of the assets was lower than market value and reflected poor busi-
ness judgment by the TRT trustees which could easily harm TRT
shareholders, SFREI would not possess knowledge sufficient to es-
tablish knowledge of the breach. 183 Perhaps an exceptionally low
price might be relevant to a discussion of whether SFREI should
have been aware of unfairness in the transaction. However, even
establishing that SFREI should have been aware of unfairness is
insufficient, since liability would require a further finding of actual
knowledge. 84
In all three cases addressing liability for aiding and abetting
the breach of fiduciary duty, the courts required that the alleged
aider and abettor have actual knowledge of conflict of interest in
the managerial decision making process. Knowledge of harm to
the shareholders of the target corporation was not sufficient.
IV. WILL THE GREENMAILER BE HELD LIABLE?
While the preceding analysis makes it clear that knowledge
of the presence of a conflict of interest in the directors' decision-
making process is the prerequisite knowledge in a claim of aiding
and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty, it is still not clear under
what circumstances the greenmailer will be held liable. As this
part of the Note will demonstrate, the likelihood of establishing
the liability of the greenmailer is related to a court's willingness to
recognize the self-interest of managers. In the end, a court's as-
sessment of the claims against the greenmailer are a function of
the court's recognition of the directors' conflict of interest. In ju-
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1028-29
184. Id. The court then gave four additional considerations which supported its deci-
sion. First, there was no duty of any type between the parties. In fact, SFREI had a duty
to its own shareholders to pursue the best price possible. Second, imposing liability with the
benefit of hindsight without concrete evidence of knowledge of conflict and of the substan-
tive unfairness of the transaction would "disrupt commercial activity in a manner wholly
inconsistent with the purposes of aider and abettor liability." Id. at 1029-30. Third, the
transaction involved no facially or overtly illicit benefit to the alleged aider and abettor
from which the court could infer actual knowledge of a breach of duty. Finally, courts are
reluctant to impose liability on managers for defensive tactics in the face of hostile take-
over attempts. The same reluctance applied to alleged aiders and abettors. Id. at 1030-31.
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risdictions in which courts are reluctant to view managerial action
as conflicted, courts will also conclude that the greenmailer did
not know of the managers' conflict. On the other hand, in jurisdic-
tions in which managerial self-interest is more readily found in the
decisionmaking process, the courts will be receptive to claims that
the greenmailer knew of the conflict and, therefore, knew of the
breach of fiduciary duty.
When courts are willing to view a managerial decision as con-
flicted, the protection of the business judgment rule is removed
and the decision is subjected to a higher level of judicial scru-
tiny.8 5 The clearest case of managerial conflict occurs when direc-
tors receive direct financial benefits from a corporate decision,
such as a director selling personal property to the corporation. In
the takeover context, however, the type of conflict alleged is a less
obvious, indirect benefit to the managers through the retention of
corporate control. The analysis by the courts in determining
whether decisions in the corporate takeover context are conflicted
is more difficult not only because the type of conflict is less obvi-
ous but also because the courts are faced with certain policy con-
cerns. The courts want to allow corporations the freedom to op-
pose offers which are detrimental to the corporation and its
shareholders. 8 6 Jurisdictions have balanced the competing con-
cerns in different ways. The following analysis sets forth the ap-
proach taken by Delaware, New York, and California. In each
case, the court's approach to the possibility of managerial conflict
of interest determines the liability of the greenmailer.
A. Under Delaware Law
Delaware's landmark case, Cheff v. Mathes,18 7 involved the
payment of greenmail to a minority shareholder. In that case,
100,000 shares of stock of the Holland Furnace Company were
acquired by an individual who, according to the board, had partic-
ipated in the liquidation of a number of companies and who was
"'well known and not highly regarded by any stretch.' "188 After
185. The relationship between conflict of interest and the business judgment rule was
set forth in part three of this Note. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
186. Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. 11. 1969).
See also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985) (recognizing
the board's duty to oppose a bid which was perceived to be harmful to the corporation).
187. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
188. Id. at 500, 199 A.2d at 551.
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the payment of greenmail, the shareholders brought a derivative
suit alleging that the "true motives behind [the] purchases were
improperly centered upon perpetuation of control."' 89
Addressing the issue of management entrenchment in Cheff,
the court recognized that "directors are of necessity confronted
with a conflict of interest" when there is a repurchase of shares in
the face of a threat to control.190 Given this conflict of interest, the
burden is on the managers to show "reasonable grounds to believe
[that] a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed."19
The directors met this burden by showing that there was a reason-
able threat to the continued existence of the corporation, at least a
threat to its existing form.192 In the end, the only way the manag-
ers would be liable for the repurchase of shares at a premium
would be if the board "acted solely or primarily because of the
desire to perpetuate themselves in office.' 193
Since retention of control was not the sole or primary cause
for the payment of greenmail, the directors were protected by the
business judgment rule. The lower level of scrutiny of the manage-
rial analysis and judgment was easily satisfied. 94 Regarding the
allegation that the premium over market price was unfair, the
court stated:
[A]s conceded by all parties, a substantial block of stock
will normally sell at a higher price than that prevailing on the
open market, the increment being attributable to a "control pre-
mium." Plaintiffs argue that it is inappropriate to require the
defendant corporation to pay a control premium, since control is
meaningless to an acquisition by a corporation of its own shares.
However, it is elementary that a holder of a substantial number
of shares would expect to receive the control premium as part of
his selling price, and if the corporation desired to obtain the
stock, it is unreasonable to expect that the corporation could
189. Id. at 504, 199 A.2d at 554.
190. Id. For those outside directors who did not have a pecuniary interest in the firm,
there was a conflict of interest amounting to less than self-dealing. Therefore, the burden of
proof required of the outside directors would be less than that imposed on inside directors.
Id. at 505, 199 A.2d at 554-55.
191. Id. at 506, 199 A.2d at 555.
192. Id. at 508, 199 A.2d at 556. In addition to allegedly posing a threat of liquida-
tion, the prospective bidder had indicated that the type of sales distribution was not "mod-
ern" and that a wholesale rather than retail distribution method was appropriate. Id. at
500, 199 A.2d at 551. The possibility that the sales force would be reorganized allegedly
caused "substantial unrest" among the employees. Id. at 500, 199 A.2d at 551-52.
193. Id. at 504, 199 A.2d at 554.
194. Id. at 506-07, 199 A.2d at 555-56.
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avoid paying what any other purchaser would be required to pay
for the stock.195
In Cheff, the groundwork was laid to accept the payment of
greenmail and to continue the application of the business judg-
ment rule unless the sole or primary managerial purpose was re-
tention of control.
Since Cheff, the Delaware courts have had several occasions
to re-examine and refine their analysis of the interplay between
conflict, as evidenced by the opportunity for retention of control,
and the business judgment rule within the takeover context.'96 In
Moran v. Household International,"9  the Delaware Supreme
Court reviewed its approach to cases involving defensive actions in
response to takeover bids:
[I]n Unocal we held that when the business judgment rule ap-
plies to adoption of a defensive mechanism, the initial burden
will lie with the directors. The "directors must show that they
had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate
policy and effectiveness existed . . . . [T]hey satisfy that burden
'by showing good faith and reasonable investigation . . . .'" In
addition, the directors must show that the defensive mechanism
was "reasonable in relation to the threat posed." Moreover, that
195. Id. at 506, 199 A.2d at 555.
196. For some of the significant cases interpreting Delaware law in this area, see
Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980)(holding that under Delaware law,
the business judgment rule is not eliminated by the showing of merely "a" control motive
rather than a sole or primary control motive, since "by the very nature of corporate life a
director has a certain amount of self-interest in everything he does" and the business judg-
ment rule is designed "to alleviate this problem by validating certain situations that other-
wise would involve a conflict of interest for the ordinary fiduciary"), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
999 (1981); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) (call-
ing for an "enhanced duty" of judicial examination at the threshold in cases involving
takeover bids and also for a judicial determination of the reasonableness of the defensive
measure in relation to the threat posed before the protection of the business judgment rule
can be applied); Moran v. Household Int'l, 490 A.2d 1059, 1076 (Del. Ch.)(in corporate
control cases the managers are afforded the protection of the business judgment rule and,
in addition, the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff), afJ'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del.
1985).
197. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). In Moran, the directors had adopted a Rights Plan
which would be triggered if a shareholder obtained 20 percent of the outstanding shares or
if a prospective bidder announced a tender offer for 30 percent of the shares. Id. at 1348. If
the Rights Plan were triggered, each common share would be entitled to purchase 1/100 of
a share of a newly issued preferred stock. Id. at 1349. If the Right to the preferred stock
was not exercised and a merger or consolidation later occurred, the shareholder would be
entitled to purchase $200 of the common stock of the tender offeror for $100. Id. The
concern was that, through this Rights Plan, the stockholders were prevented from receiving
tender offers. Id. at 1353-54.
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proof is material[ly] enhanced . . where, as here, a majority of
the board favoring the proposal consisted of outside independent
directors who have acted in accordance with the foregoing stan-
dards. Then, the burden shifts back to the plaintiffs who have
the ultimate burden of persuasion to show a breach of the direc-
tors' fiduciary duties.198
While the law appears to impose a heavy burden on managers, in
practice the Delaware courts are very tolerant and accept a wide
variety of justifications for the payment of greenmail. Managers
are given wide latitude, and the courts are reluctant to conclude
that the conflict of interest rises to a level that requires with-
drawal of the business judgment rule.
The effect of this lenient approach on the analysis of aiding
and abetting is illustrated in Polk v. Good.'99 In Polk, the Su-
preme Court of Delaware reviewed a lower court decision approv-
ing the settlement and dismissal of consolidated shareholder class
and derivative actions against Texaco, its board of directors, and
the "Bass" investment group.200 While Texaco was involved in ac-
quiring Getty Oil Company, Texaco's largest shareholder, the
Bass group, began increasing their holdings of outstanding com-
mon stock from 5 percent to 9.9 percent.2 10 The Bass group indi-
cated that it might obtain as much as twenty percent of the out-
standing stock, "hinting" at a possible tender offer.202 However,
before any tender offer was made, Texaco repurchased the Bass
group's shares203 for a total of $1.2 billion, including a premium
of $400 million.20 4 The complaint alleged that the Bass group
aided and abetted Texaco directors in their breach of fiduciary
duty.205
In affirming the decision for the defendant, the Supreme
Court reiterated the broad protection provided by the business
judgment rule.206 Since ten of the thirteen board members were
outside directors, the lower court saw no evidence of self-inter-
est.207 While some plaintiffs still wanted to press suit, their attor-
198. Id. at 1356 (citations omitted).
199. 507 A.2d 531 (Del. 1986).
200. Id. at 533.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 534.
204. Good v. Texaco, No. 7501, slip op. (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 1985).
205. Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 534 (Del. 1986).
206. Id. at 535.
207. Id.
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neys concluded "that if the case went to trial, they could not over-
come the presumption of the business judgment rule as to the
issues remaining."2 ° According to the chancery court, the plain-
tiffs were "completely stymied by the rule of Cheff v. Mathes...
and the similar Delaware case precedents."20 9
The message of Polk is that under Delaware law the protec-
tions afforded the managers are so great and the burden of proof
on the plaintiff is so heavy that it is unlikely that the court will be
willing to recognize the presence of conflict of interest in the man-
agers. The decision to acquire Getty is protected by the business
judgment rule. The directors can justify their actions to thwart
the potential tender offer by pointing to the possible disruption of
the plan to acquire Getty. The courts are unwilling to scrutinize
either decision to see if conflict of interest is present. This reluc-
tance by the court means that allegations of aiding and abetting
will rarely succeed.
B. Under New York Law
Applying New York law in Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace
Inc.,21 0 the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit took a less
tolerant approach to the defensive tactics 211 of defendant Norlin
Corp. The court reviewed the grant of a preliminary injunction
which barred Norlin from voting certain recently issued shares.212
The court took a more restrictive approach to the defensive
tactics in three ways. First, the court noted that once the plaintiff
has made a prima facie case showing that the directors have "a"
self-interest in a particular corporate transaction, the burden
shifts to the defendants to demonstrate that the transaction is fair
and serves the best interests of the corporation and its sharehold-
ers.213 This conclusion conflicts with Delaware law which holds
that "a" control motive is insufficient; the control motive must be
the primary or sole motive before the burden shifts.214 Second, the
208. Id.
209. Good v. Texaco, No. 7501, slip op. (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 1985).
210. 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984).
211. In its defense, Norlin increased its voting control by issuing new common and
voting preferred stock to a wholly owned subsidiary and a newly created employee stock
option plan. Id. at 258.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 264. However, the court did not withdraw the protection of the business
judgment rule with the showing of "a" self-interest.
214. See supra note 196.
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court rejected the great weight which Delaware gives to the pres-
ence of a majority of outside directors on the board. 15 Finally, the
court noted that the duty of loyalty requires the board to demon-
strate that any actions it does take are fair and reasonable. 16
While Delaware requires the same showing,217 the two jurisdic-
tions have very different expectations in this area. Delaware ap-
pears to accept almost any justification for the defense tactic. Any
threat to the continued existence of the corporation in its present
form2 8 appears sufficient. The Delaware courts gloss over the
"reasonableness" analysis. By contrast, the Norlin court specifi-
cally "rejected" the view, propounded by Norlin, that once it con-
cludes that an actual or anticipated takeover attempt is not in the
best interests of the company, a board of directors may take any
action necessary to forestall acquisitive moves.219 The "reasona-
bleness" of the reaction is a critical element of a valid defense.
The implications for the greenmailer of the more restrictive
New York law are illustrated in Samuel M. Feinberg Testamen-
tary Trust v. Carter.220 In that case, Carl Icahn acquired 4.9 per-
cent of Goodrich's common stock. He then announced his plans
either to acquire up to a 30 percent interest which he hoped to
combine with the interests of others to obtain control, or to obtain
a seat on the Goodrich board of directors. 22' However, Icahn also
offered to sell his 4.9 percent interest for a sum which included a
25 percent premium above market price.222 Approximately a week
and a half later, the directors accepted Icahn's offer and paid the
greenmail. While Icahn's behavior may appear to be reprehensi-
ble, it only serves to satisfy the element of substantially assisting
the managers' breach. For Icahn to have knowledge of the breach
requires that he know of the managers' conflict of interest. This
215. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 266-67 n.12 (2d Cir. 1984).
The court noted:
We are not persuaded that a different test applies to "independent" as op-
posed to "inside" directors under the business judgment rule .... In any event,
once a collective conflict of interest underlying the board's action is shown, any
such distinction has no bearing on the fairness and reasonableness of the action
taken.
Id.
216. Id. at 266-67.
217. See supra text accompanying note 193.
218. See Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 508, 199 A.2d 548, 556 (1964).
219. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265-66 (2d Cir. 1984).
220. 652 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
221. Id. at 1069.
222. Id. at 1069. The premium amounted to $8 million. Id. at 1073.
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finding, in turn, is a function of the court's willingness to find con-
flicts in the managers.
The Feinberg court noted that in cases in which management
may be faced with a threat to control, the burden of proof shifts
to the defendants, thereby denying them "'the more extreme pro-
tection of the business judgment rule.' "I" The court carefully
noted the secrecy surrounding the greenmail payment, 24 the di-
rectors' failure to give any reason for the greenmail other than the
desire to ward off a takeover attempt,225 and the reasons to attri-
bute self-interest motives to independent directors. 226 The court
concluded that the claim against Icahn alleging aiding and abet-
ting could stand.227 Icahn "may be held to have known that the
directors' payment of the premium unquestionably would harm
Goodrich and its shareholders, that such a payment would thus
constitute a breach of the Goodrich directors' fiduciary duty, and
that despite this knowledge he assisted therein for personal
gain. 228 Close scrutiny of the directors' conflict facilitates estab-
lishing the elements of aiding and abetting.
C. Under California Law
The Ninth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals, in
Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp.,229 concluded that management must
demonstrate more than that the corporation derived some advan-
tage from its actions.230 When there is detriment to the minority
223. Id. at 1081 (quoting Danaher Corp. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 633 F.
Supp. 1066, 1070 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
224. Id. at 1070. Icahn had specifically agreed not to disclose the greenmail payment
unless required by law to do so. Id.
225. Id. at 1073. There is no indication that Icahn knew the Goodrich managers
would be so lacking in imagination that they could not supply any specific reason to justify
the greenmail payment.
226. Id. at 1070. While a Delaware test for director interest would probably stop at
the observation that nine of the twelve directors were independent, the Feinberg court went
on to detail the specific ways in which the "independent" directors could be deemed self-
interested. All directors received a base fee of $18,000, an additional fee of $500 for each
meeting attended, and stock options. Id.
227. Id. at 1083-84.
228. Id.
229. 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975). In Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., the target corpora-
tion, Hi-Shear, acquired two different corporations by issuing new stock, and also created
an Employee Stock Ownership Trust to which Hi-Shear donated treasury shares. The ef-
fect of these defensive tactics was to dilute the voting power of Klaus, the offeror. Id. at
228-29.
230. Id. at 233.
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stockholders, the directors must present evidence tending to show
either good faith or a compelling business purpose which would
indicate that their action was fair under the circumstances. 31 To
determine if there is a "compelling business purpose," the court
suggested balancing "the good to the corporation against the dis-
proportionate advantage to the majority shareholders and incum-
bent management."23 2 Apparently, if the advantage of the trans-
action is greater for the majority shareholders (and for incumbent
management) than it is for the corporation, the business purpose
is not "compelling" and fairness is not established. This approach
is far more demanding than that of jurisdictions requiring only "a
rational business purpose."
The more rigorous approach of California is reflected in the
state Supreme Court's analysis of the payment of greenmail. As
set forth earlier, in Heckmann v. Ahmanson23 3 the directors of
Walt Disney Productions paid greenmail to Saul Steinberg and
others.2 4 In addressing the behavior of the directors, the court
concluded that it was not necessary for the court to be presented
with a "smoking gun.1235 The court believed that the evidence
before it was sufficient to demonstrate a probability of success on
the merits.23 6 The main evidence before the court was that the
Disney directors had acquired Arvida Corporation, assumed its
debt, and offered to repurchase the Steinberg shares on the same
day that the tender offer was revealed.237 On these facts the court
concluded that the directors would probably be liable for a breach
of fiduciary duty.
It is clear that the Heckmann court viewed defensive tactics
as prima facie evidence of an attempt by management to retain
control. Therefore, in the court's opinion, "[t]he acts of the Dis-
ney directors - and particularly their timing - are difficult to
understand except as defensive strategies against a hostile take-
over." 238 The acquisition of Arvida was characterized as a "well-
231. Id. at 233-34 (quoting Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 114, 460
P.2d 464, 476, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 604 (1969)).
232. Id. at 234. The court found a "compelling business purpose" existed for the two
acquisitions, but not for the employee stock option plan. Id.
233. 168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1985).
234. See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text.
235. Heckmann, 168 Cal. App. 3d at 128, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 124, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
238. Id. at 128, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
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recognized defensive tactic by a board seeking to retain con-
trol. '2 39 The California Supreme Court does not recognize the
ambiguity of theory surrounding the payment of greenmail. All
defensive tactics are viewed as evidence that management has at-
tempted to retain control.
The court noted that the burden shifts to the directors to
demonstrate the good faith and inherent fairness of the transac-
tion once it is shown that a director received a personal benefit
from the transaction.240 After observing that there appeared to be
a benefit to the directors in this case, the court concluded that
Disney's explanation that the corporation and the shareholders
would be harmed by the announced tender offer was
inadequate.241
Under California law, the greenmailer is in a precarious posi-
tion. The court begins with the assumption that defensive tactics
are entrenchment devices. The burden immediately shifts to the
defendant managers to show a compelling business purpose and
the overall fairness of the transaction. If this is not successfully
accomplished, the directors will be liable for breach. The aiding
and abetting requirement of knowledge of the breach is satisfied if
the greenmailer merely knows that the action taken would be cat-
egorized as a defensive measure. From this knowledge alone the
greenmailer is assumed to have actual knowledge of the conflict of
the directors.242
CONCLUSION
There appears to be a consensus among the courts that the
crucial element in establishing the liability of the greenmailer in a
claim of aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duty is knowl-
edge of the presence of conflict in the decisionmaking of the direc-
tors. The relative willingness of the courts to attribute control mo-
tives to the directors in the act of paying greenmail will determine
the courts' willingness to conclude that the greenmailer knew the
directors were conflicted. Those jurisdictions which recognize the
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. In Heckmann, the court stated that "[t]he Steinberg group knew it was resell-
ing its stock at a price considerably above market value to enable the Disney directors to
retain control of the corporation." Id. at 127, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 182 (emphasis added). The
court sees no ambiguity in the payment of greenmail. The self-interest of the managers is
assumed.
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ambiguity of the theory of greenmail will be unwilling to suspend
the business judgment rule protections and carefully scrutinize the
directors' behavior. The conclusion likely to be drawn is that the
directors were not conflicted and that the greenmailer had no ac-
tual knowledge of the conflict. Jurisdictions in which the ambigu-
ity of the theory of greenmail is given little weight will character-
ize the payment of greenmail as a defensive tactic undertaken
primarily for the retention of control. In these jurisdictions, the
greenmailer will automatically be attributed with knowledge of
the directors' conflict.
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